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Miller v. Davis:
The Sixth Circuit Applies
Interest Analysis to an Erie
Problem
By

JOHN

R.

LEATHERS*

INTRODUCTION

The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
in Miller v. Davis' furnishes new support for the earlier contentions of this author' that the solution to Erie3 problems must
come from an analysis of the policies behind competing rules
of law rather than from reliance on labels or "magical" tests.
The opinion in Miller will be examined in the context of my
previous analysis in the hope of further illustrating the workings of that approach. Hopefully, this consideration of Miller
will cast additional light on the technique formerly explicated
and provide an approach to the unraveling of Erie questions.
Before beginning an examination of Miller, it is necessary
to restate my earlier conclusions concerning the methodology
for dealing with Erie problems. Solutions cannot be found by
the application of labels such as "substance-procedure" or the
use of formulas such as "outcome-determination." When a federal rule of law is in apparent conflict with a state rule, an
interest analysis must be used to choose between them. This
methodology is borrowed from modern interstate choice of law
systems because federal-state conflicts display problems similar to those involved in choosing between competing state laws.
Analysis has replaced rules of thumb in state choice of law
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.B.A. 1968, University
of Texas at El Paso; J.D. 1971, University of New Mexico; LL.M. 1972, Columbia
University.
507 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1974).
Leathers, Erie and Its Progeny As Choice of Law Cases, 11 Hous. L. REv. 791
(1974).
3 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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problems and there is no reason why this growing body of
knowledge should not be used to good advantage in the area of
conflicting state and federal law. In either situation, an intelligent decision would seem to demand that the policies behind
the competing rules be identified in order to determine if those
policies will be furthered by application of one rule or another
to the fact pattern at hand. If an underlying policy will not be
served by a law's application to a given set of facts, the sovereign furnishing the rule has no legitimate interest in having
that rule applied and the conflict is illusory. If there is a legitimate state interest and no legitimate federal interest, the state
interest must prevail under the command of the tenth amendment.4 Conversely, if there is a legitimate federal interest and
no legitimate state interest, the federal interest must prevail
under the mandate of the supremacy clause.5 In both of these
situations, any apparent conflict dissolves with the realization
that one of the competing policies would not be furthered by
that sovereign's law being applied to the particular fact pattern. A true conflict is presented, however, if both federal and
state rules promote legitimate interests, the normal presumption being that federal law must prevail under the command
of the supremacy clause. There are, however, instances in
which the federal interest is weak when compared to the state
interest. In such cases, it is permissible to defer to the state
interest after a careful weighing. The power to weigh and balance, which on its face seems incompatible with the supremacy
clause, has two sources: the Rules of Decision Act,6 where a
' U.S. CONST. amend. X. This amendment provides: "The powers not delegated

to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. This clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
* 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970). The statute provides: "The laws of the several states,
except where the constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in
the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." Similar provisions have
been in effect since the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, in which § 34 contained substantially the same provision.

1975]

MILLER V. DAVIS: INTEREST ANALYSIS

federal rule of civil procedure is not in issue, and the Rules
Enabling Act 7 in cases involving a federal rule of civil procedure. Deference to the state interest is unlikely when a procedural rule is directly on point, but will more likely occur when
a rule must be construed. This brief view of my earlier
conclusions depicts what is hopefully a truly analytical choice
of law system.
It is, in short, an interest analysis, controlled by the parameters of both constitutional and legislative directives and
spawned from the decision in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York. 8
Although there is no express indication that the Sixth Circuit
followed such a choice of law analysis in Miller v. Davis, such
as that outlined here, its decision conforms to the result which
an interest analysis would necessarily produce. The court in
Miller considered the policies behind competing rules in a
manner consistent with this proposed interest analysis and it
is for that reason that Miller provides an excellent example of
how federal courts should resolve Erie problems.

I. MILLER

AND THE

ERIE PROBLEM IT PRESENTED

Miller v. Davis was a suit brought by Kentucky citizens9
against the trustees of the United Mine Workers of America
Welfare and Retirement Fund [hereinafter referred to as the
Fund], wherein the plaintiffs alleged that the Fund wrongfully
withheld their benefits. Although it cannot be verified from the
opinion, it appears that the trustees of the Fund were not citizens of Kentucky; this discussion will proceed on the assumption that the basis of subject matter jurisdiction in the suit was
7 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1966). The statute provides in part as follows:

The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules,
the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and
procedure of the district courts and courts of appeals of the United States
in civil actions ...
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right
and shall preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared
by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.
8 326 U.S. 99 (1945). It is my belief that Guaranty Trust was so intended, though
it has not necessarily been interpreted in this light.
I This fact is not clear at this point in time, but was assumed by the Sixth Circuit
in its opinion. Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 311 (6th Cir. 1974).
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diversity."1 Although there is some confusion as to the basis of
subject matter jurisdiction, it does not affect the manner in
which the Sixth Circuit dealt with the Erie problem presented.
Even if the case were dismissed on remand for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, the technique of the court is worthy of
discussion. In such event, the decision in Miller might be of
dubious value as precedent but would still provide valuable
insight into the methodology for dealing with such problems.
Thus, these technical difficulties will be ignored and attention
will be focused on the Erie issue and the Sixth Circuit's technique in solving it.
The Erie problem in Miller had its genesis in an earlier
case considered by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, Wilder v.
United Mine Workers of America." Like Miller, the Wilder
case involved a suit against the Fund by a Kentucky citizen
alleging wrongful deprivation of pension benefits. The Kentucky Court dismissed the claim on the ground that the state
courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction. This decision, then,
created an Erie problem when the Miller suit was brought in
the Kentucky federal system. The Erie issue was whether a
federal court can assert jurisdiction over a diversity claim
which the state courts of the forum would dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction. Had the Miller case been filed in the Kentucky
state courts, it would, subject to a possible qualification to be
discussed later, have been dismissed by those state courts for
lack of jurisdiction. There is no doubt that federal courts often
hear claims which the state courts cannot hear, but the question is whether a court can do so when its basis of federal
subject matter jurisdiction is diversity. The Sixth Circuit concluded, and I believe correctly so, that the federal court could
exercise jurisdiction despite a different result in the state system.
It should first be noted that the court in Miller did not hold
10 The plaintiffs in the action asserted subject matter jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(c), but the Sixth Circuit found this not to be a jurisdictional statute. The Court
allowed time on remand for amendment showing subject matter jurisdiction under the
diversity provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 311 (6th Cir.
1974).
" 346 S.W.2d 27 (Ky. 1961).
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that the federal court in Kentucky had in personam jurisdiction over the Fund or the Trustees. This was a question which
was expressly not answered and left open for determination on
remand.' 2 The Wilder decision predated the enactment of the
Kentucky long arm statute, and it is quite conceivable that the
decision of the Kentucky Court in Wilder rested at least in part
on the lack of in personam jurisdiction over the Fund or the
Trustees. Should this in personam jurisdiction position (if indeed it existed at all) not be changed by the subsequent enactment of the Kentucky long arm statute, 3 the federal system
would be obliged to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction.
It has been well settled since Arrowsmith v. United Press
International4 that a federal district court sitting in diversity
litigation must adhere to the long arm provisions of the state
in which it sits.'" Although it is not clear that the relevant
portion of the Kentucky long arm statute"6 will give in personam jurisdiction over the Fund or Trustees in a case like
Miller, only competence would be lacking since there would
appear to be no due process objections to the exercise of in
personam jurisdiction in such a case. 7 In any case, the federal
Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 315 n.14 (6th Cir. 1974).
Ky. REv. STAT. § 454.210 (1973) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
" 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
25 Although the Supreme Court has not ruled specifically on the point, a federal
court in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 377 U.S. 535 (1949) was required to follow a
Mississippi statute that was a portion of a primitive long arm scheme. The Mississippi
statute involved in the case required that for a foreign corporation to have access as a
party plaintiff to the courts of the state it must appoint an agent to accept service of
process.
Is KRS § 454.210 (1973). Relevant portions of the statute are as follows:
(2)(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts
directly or by an agent, as to a claim arising from the person's:
1. Transacting any business in this commonwealth;
2. Contracting to supply services or goods in this commonwealth;
22
"

7. Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this
commonwealth at the time of contracting.
It seems possible that any or all of these sections would confer in personam jurisdiction
over the Fund or the Trustees and there would seem to be no viable due process
objection to such jurisdiction.
" In a similar fact pattern, a California court exercised quasi in rem jurisdiction
on the basis of minimum contacts and did not run afoul of constitutional complications. Atkinson v. Superior Court, 316 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1957).
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district court in Kentucky must follow the state position on in
personam jurisdiction. Hopefully, on remand the federal district court will have no difficulty finding that the Kentucky
long arm statute extends to the defendants in Miller.
If the decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Wilder
rested entirely on lack of in personam jurisdiction, the problem
in Miller could be easily solved. It would simply involve application of the long arm statute. There would be no problem with
a federal court deciding to ignore a state court decision such as
Wilder when it concluded that the state law contained therein
would no longer be followed in that state. 8 In fact, a concurring
opinion in Miller advocated ignoring Wilder on the basis that
it was no longer good law in the Kentucky courts. 9 This same
approach could have been taken to settle even the more difficult problems posed by Wilder. The majority in Miller did not
adopt this position and was very careful to say that it would
not express an opinion on whether the additional grounds of the
Wilder decision would still be followed in the Kentucky state
courts. It must, however, be conceded that the general tone of
the decision implies that the majority believed Wilder to be of
dubious value even in the Kentucky courts. Some may question the wisdom of the court in not simply ignoring Wilder. Had
it rested its decision on this ground, the Sixth Circuit would not
have had to discuss the extent to which a divergence of results
between the state and federal systems was possible. Having
rejected this approach, the court had to face the question of the
extent to which a federal court in Kentucky could ignore the
policy grounds of the Wilder decision.
II. THE

SIXTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH TO THE ERIE PROBLEM

Having chosen the more difficult path to a solution of the
Miller case, the Sixth Circuit did not deal with the issue of
permissible divergence in terms of facilely applied labels or
formulas. The court analyzed the policies underlying the state
s The Supreme Court seems not to have ruled directly that a federal court may

ignore state law which it feels would no longer be followed in state court, but there is
dicta to that effect in some opinions. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Amer-

ica, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
" Miller v. Davis 507 F.2d 308, 318 (6th Cir. 1974) (McCree, J., concurring).
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decision in Wilder to determine if those policies were relevant
to an action being tried in the federal courts rather than in the
state courts. Finding some aspects of Wilder to be valid in a
suit in federal court, the Sixth Circuit weighed these considerations against the federal interests present in the case. It is
exactly this type of analysis which is needed to solve the difficult problems of the application of state law in a federal forum.
The Sixth Circuit first identified the policy bases of the
Kentucky Court of Appeals decision in Wilder. The court found
these to have been personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and
venue."0 To the extent that Wilder rested on personal jurisdictional problems, the answer to the propriety of jurisdiction in
Miller must await remand for construction and application of
the Kentucky long arm statute. As noted, the federal court will
follow that statute. It is the handling of the other two policies
of Wilder, choice of law and venue, which makes the decision
in Miller noteworthy.
A.

Venue Policies

Although considered last by the Sixth Circuit, the venue
policies of Wilder will be considered first here because the
problems raised are more easily disposed of than those presented by the choice of law issue. The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Wilder reached the conclusion that the Kentucky state
courts could not adjudicate the controversy because of the following portion of the Restatement (First)of Conflicts: "The
administration of a trust of movables is supervised by the
courts of that state only in which the administration of the
trust is located. 2 1 This meant in Wilder, and it was argued
that it meant in Miller, that the courts (whether state or federal) located in Kentucky would not adjudicate legal disputes
concerning a trust of movables situate in the District of Columbia. The court noted that the Restatement section was based
on the concept of venue and that it may have had some relationship to forum non conveniens.2 1 In either event, these poli" Id. at 315.
21

RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF CONFLIrC

OF LAWS

§ 299 (1934).

Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 316 n.17 (6th Cir. 1974). The Sixth Circuit indicated that these policies behind § 299 of the Restatement (First)could be ascertained
2
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cies are not relevant to an action being heard in federal court.
The state interest in venue and forum non conveniens concerns
ease in the conduct of litigation and does not relate to the
merits of the litigation. Analysis reveals that the issue presents
a false conflict, since only the federal forum has a legitimate
interest in convenience and propriety of trial location when the
chosen forum is federal. The federal courts should, then, be free
to ignore the state decision in Wilder to the extent that it was
based on venue and forum non conveniens considerations. To
summarize briefly, the Sixth Circuit disposed of the venue and
convenience questions, left open the personal jurisdiction problems for a determination on remand, and then dealt with the
most difficult issue, that of choice of law.
B.

The Choice of Law Issue

The United States Supreme Court with its decision in
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing C0.23 has left no
doubt that federal district courts must follow the choice of law
rules of the state in which they sit. Despite much agitation for
change from this rigid postion, it would seem to be as stringent
a requirement now as ever. Thus, if Wilder is a Kentucky
choice of law case, the Sixth Circuit was treading on very thin
ice in allowing a district court to reach a result contrary to that
of Wilder. The court at this point in its decision seems to have
skirted the issue by casting doubt on the probability of Kentucky's future adherence to the Restatement (First) position
followed in Wilder.24 The court reasoned that the Restatement
position lost much of its attraction when the uniformity for
which it strove began to break down as many states abandoned
the vested rights approach to choice of law. The Restatement
(First)'srigid deference to the courts of the trust situs was not
followed in the Restatement (Second) 5 and the Sixth Circuit
from the comments to the Restatement. In candor, there is nothing in those comments
to so indicate although it is likely that the policies identified by the court are correct.
313 U.S. 487 (1941).
24

Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 315-16 (6th Cir. 1974).

21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 267 (1971). This section would

indicate that supervision is possible where the trustee has qualified as trustee or where
the trust is to be administered. The comments of this section indicate a departure from
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indicated that this might be a factor inducing Kentucky to
abandon the Wilder position.
However, to the extent that the court wanted to explore
the possibility that Kentucky would no longer adhere to the
Restatement (First)position taken in Wilder, it was on safe
ground. As noted before, federal courts can ignore state decisions if they feel such decisions would no longer be followed in
the state system. Recent events in the choice of law area in
Kentucky leave little doubt that the least the Kentucky courts
would do is abandon § 299 of the Restatement (First)as the
rationale for the access result reached in Wilder.2" It is possible,
though not likely, that the Wilder result would be reached in a
new case, but it is certain that the reason for the decision would
not be the Restatement (First).The Kentucky courts might go
a good bit further, in light of the connection of the Fund to
Kentucky domiciliaries. Given the apparent determination of
the Kentucky courts to apply their own law to litigation whenever it is possible for them to do so, 27 in a new case the Kentucky state courts might apply Kentucky law rather than District of Columbia law to the merits of the litigation. Even
though the Sixth Circuit's conclusion concerning the status of
the Restatement (First)is sound, the court should be very careful of basing its evaluation of Kentucky conflicts law on the
Restatement (Second). It has been made quite clear in recent
Kentucky cases that the state will not adhere to the
Restatement (Second).2s
Once again in Miller, then, there was for the Sixth Circuit
an easy solution to the Erie problem posed by Wilder-ignore
the Restatement (First)position of having only one court supervise trust administration.
2' Kentucky abandoned the vested rights position of the Restatement (First) in
regard to choice of law for tort cases in Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967).
Since that time the interest analysis applied by the Kentucky Court of Appeals has
shown a definite preference for forum law. This led to a choice of law in favor of the
forum in the very close case of Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968).
" See, e.g., cases cited in notes 26 & 28.
" Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972). The Court of Appeals in that case
said explicitly that it was not making a choice of law based on the "most significant
contacts" (which would have been the Restatement (Second) position) but on
sufficient contacts. This indicates a definite preference for forum law, a preference not
contained in the Restatement (Second).
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an aspect of Wilder as no longer being good law in the Kentucky courts. Once again the Sixth Circuit was very careful not
to second-guess the continued validity of Wilder in the Kentucky courts. The Sixth Circuit does not favor the Wilder decision, but its decision in Miller did not rest on the assumption
that Kentucky would no longer follow that opinion.
If Miller stands for the proposition that a federal court
may ignore the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits,
the decision is both erroneous and dangerous. The policies behind the Klaxon decision, such as avoidance of intrastate
forum shopping, are so clear that the federal courts must follow
those state rules no matter how weak they perceive the policy
behind a particular rule to be. The choice of law situation in a
federal forum, in terms of the analysis developed herein, represents a true conflict, since the federal system, through full faith
and credit, has the ability to control the choice of law area.
Congress has directed in the Rules of Decision Act29 that the
Weak federal interest in this area be subordinated to the very
substantial state interest."0 It might be added that such deference furthers a federal policy against forum shopping. This
message was made extremely clear in Klaxon and has not been
departed from since that decision was handed down. Consequently, had Miller been ignoring the Kentucky choice of law
rule articulated in Wilder, it would be violative of Klaxon. But,
though Miller may appear at first glance to have done exactly
that, it did not do so and is not violative of Klaxon. Rather,
Miller was correctly decided on the facts presented because
neither Miller nor Wilder represented the application of a
choice of law rule.
C.

The Real Issue: Access to Kentucky Courts

The issue in both Miller and Wilder was that of access to
the courts located in the state of Kentucky, and, on the issue
of access, Klaxon is inapplicable. Although the Sixth Circuit
in Miller incorrectly identified the issue at hand as one of
choice of law, they handled the question as if it were one of
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970).
0 Leathers, supra note 2.

2
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access, and in a correct fashion. The only caveat here is that

the distinction between access and choice of law must not be
forgotten. The res judicata difference between the two is crucial. Miller cannot and should not be cited for the premise that
a federal court can ignore the choice of law rules of the state in
which it sits, because the real issue in Miller was whether a
federal court may ignore the access rule of the state in which
it sits.3'
There is little doubt that Wilder was an access case rather
than a choice of law case. Even ignoring the in personam jurisdictional aspects of the decision, it cannot seriously be contended that the decision in Wilder settled the merits of the
plaintiff's claim for pension benefits. The Wilder decision did
not approach the substance of the plaintiff's claim, but simply
determined that, regardless of the validity of the claim, it
would not be adjudicated in the Kentucky state courts. This
left the plaintiff in Wilder free to bring the claim elsewhere.
Only an access decision would leave the plaintiff's claim in this
posture; a choice of law decision would not have done so. It is
clear from the decision in Miller that the Sixth Circuit was
cognizant of these aspects of Wilder, even if the Court did not
articulate the distinction between access and choice of law.
The entire discussion in Miller centered around the policy of
"door-closing" in Kentucky. The principal cases which the
Sixth Circuit distinguished in order to allow the federal court
to reach a result different from that of the state court were
cases involving door-closing statutes. It is in the handling of
those door-closing cases, Woods v. Interstate Realty Co. 2 and
Angel v. Bullington, 3 that the interest
analysis of the Sixth
3
Circuit was especially impressive.
1,

1

For a detailed discussion of the dichotomy between access and choice of law,

see Leathers, Dimensions of the ConstitutionalObligationto Provide a Forum, 62 Ky.
L.J. 1 (1973).
32 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
- 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
31Both Angel and Woods involved strong state policies that would have been
frustrated if suit were permitted in federal court. North Carolina had a clear policy in
favor of debtors by forbidding deficiency judgments; hence the result in Angel. In
Woods, the Court recognized Mississippi's legitimate policy of encouraging foreign
corporations doing business in Mississippi to register in that state.
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An initial distinction between Woods, Angel and Miller
could be made from the fact that the first two cases involved
door-closing based on statutory law while the door-closing in
Miller sprang from the decisional mandate of Wilder. This is
not a material distinction since Erie put to rest the notion that
the federal courts might ignore state decisional law while being
bound by state statutory law. It would not even be correct to
draw comparisons between the relative strengths of decisional
and statutory door-closing law. It is the nature and strength of
the policy behind a door-closing requirement which determines
whether a federal court must follow it, the source of the policy
being immaterial. The Sixth Circuit was quite correct in pointing to Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp.35 as support for the
principle that where a door-closing requirement is based on a
policy not relevant to suit brought in federal court, it may be
ignored even though it is a requirement mandated by state
statute. This would indicate that in the absence of a relevant
policy, the state rule, regardless of its source, could be ignored
in favor of a legitimate federal policy. In terms of interest analysis, this would present a false conflict in which there is a
legitimate federal interest and no state interest. Naturally, the
choice would be in favor of the federal policy, for the supremacy
clause will tolerate no other result. It would also seem that a
weak state policy on door-closing would allow the assertion of
a stronger federal interest in favor of access. This result, made
possible by the Rules of Decision Act, is precisely what the
Sixth Circuit accomplished when faced with a weak state interest in Miller.
D.

The Court's Analysis of the Conflicting State and Federal
Policies on Access
The policy behind the Kentucky access denial in Wilder
may have involved some notions of venue and forum non conveniens. These policies are not relevant to a suit brought in the
federal system, which has its own venue and transfer provisions. Kentucky's access denial may also have had fairness
considerations designed to protect the trustees in such cases
349 F.2d 60, 64-5 (4th Cir. 1965).
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from being sued away from the trust situs. This policy is much
weakened by the fact that other states no longer adhere to it,
allowing their citizens to sue in courts away from the trust
situs.3 8 A third rationale for the Wilder decision may have been
to insure uniformity by making all persons with claims against
the Fund assert such claims before the same court, that of the
District of Columbia. 3 This policy, too, is weakened by the fact
that other states are now allowing their citizens to sue the Fund
outside the District of Columbia. The Sixth Circuit concluded
that the desire for uniformity would best be served by allowing
suit in a federal forum since such suits were being brought in
federal courts in other states.3 8 Federal courts cannot dictate
this policy to the states but the Sixth Circuit did consider this
possibility in weighing the strength of the state policy behind
its door-closing rule.
Another possible rationale for the Wilder decision may
have been the apparent inability of the state to exercise quasi
in rem jurisdiction over a trust situate in the District of Columbia. Such jurisdiction was available in fact, even when Wilder
was decided, if only the traditional limited view of quasi in rem
jurisdiction had been put aside.3 9 But whatever the status then
or now of such jurisdiction, the policy behind it would be irrelevant to an in personam action such as Miller. All of these
factors point out that the state interest in closing the forum
doors to such suits was either irrelevant or weak. The policies
of venue, forum non conveniens, and quasi in rem jurisdiction
would be irrelevant when the suit was brought in federal court
in personam; the policies of fairness and uniformity would be
weak no matter what the forum, due to changes in the law of
other jurisdictions since Wilder was decided. Despite all these
considerations however, there was present in Miller a legitimate state interest that required the court to weigh the relative
merits of Kentucky's door-closing policy against the federal
interests in hearing the suit. 0
See, e.g., Rittenberry v. Lewis, 333 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1964). This case involved
a suit against the Fund in Tennessee.
3 Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 315 (6th Cir. 1974).
38 Id. at 318.
31'Atkinson v. Superior Court, 316 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1957).
40 It should be noted that the discussion of Kentucky state interests assumes that
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The federal interest in reaching a result different from that
which would have been reached by the Kentucky state courts
was correctly identified by the Sixth Circuit as being the provision of a forum for claims between parties of diverse citizenship." Although there has been much said aid written over the
years about federal diversity jurisdiction existing to protect the
nonresident suitor against local bias, local citizens with claims
against nonresidents have always had access in the bringing of
an action on the same basis as nonresident plaintiffs. Having
failed to restrict the access of a resident as a party plaintiff, it
must be reasoned that Congress intended for local residents to
have access on the same basis as nonresidents. Access for local
residents may be especially important in a case, such as Miller,
where a local resident finds his claim looked upon with disfavor
in terms of access in the state courts of his residence. Once
the door-closing rule of Kentucky was constitutional when applied by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals in Wilder. Since the result in Wilder was a denial of access to a claim
based on the law of the District of Columbia, the validity of such denial would have
to be measured against legislation calling for full faith and credit to the laws of the
District. 28 U.S.C. §1738 (1964). A more in-depth examination of the access requirements of full faith and credit has already been made elsewhere. See Leathers, supra
note 2. There is no need to repeat that discussion, except to note that those requirements are applicable to Wilder. The Sixth Circuit was correct in assuming that the
door-closing statute in Woods was permissible since it was important to the implementation of the Mississippi long arm scheme. The court was also correct in assuming the
door-closing in Szantay to have been permissible since it had been based on a policy
of forum non conveniens. Recall that the federal courts were required to adhere to the
door-closing of Woods, but not of Szantay. The Sixth Circuit was on much weaker
ground, however, in assuming the door-closing statute in Angel v. Bullington to have
been constitutional. See Leathers, supra note 2, at 20 n.92. The couit said that the
North Carolina denial of access to suits for deficiency judgments was upheld in Angel
and that the denial was to be followed in the federal courts as well as in the state
courts. The problem with this conclusion is that the decision in Angel rested on the
alternate grounds of Erie and res judicata considerations, the issue of the constitutionality of the state statute never being decided by the United States Supreme Court.
Thus it is unclear whether or not the door-closing policy of North Carolina was violative of the full faith and credit clause. Assuming it to have been constitutional, there
is little doubt that it should be followed in the federal courts because of the strength
of the North Carolina policy against suits for deficiency judgments. Therefore, despite
the weakness of at least one precedent upon which it relied, the Sixth Circuit was
correct in its conclusion that Kentucky could, if it wished, close its doors as it had done
in Wilder. The policies behind the Kentucky door-closing rule were different from
those which led the Supreme Court to overrule a door-closing scheme as unconstitutional in another case. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
41 Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 316-18 (6th Cir. 1974).
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again it must be remembered that the Kentucky bias against
the claim was not sufficient to go to the merits of the claim but
only to the provision of a forum for the claim. Furnishing a
forum for parties of diverse citizenship 2 to litigate a claim
based on the law of another jurisdiction of the United States
is the interest which the federal system had in ignoring the
Wilder door-closing requirement in Miller.
In terms of an interest analysis, the Sixth Circuit in Miller
was faced with a true conflict, a fact which seems to have been
reflected in the general criteria under which the court decided
the case. An extended discussion of the court's rationale will
follow, because that rationale is much more important than the
conclusion which was reached by the court. First, the result is
justifiable in terms of the interest analysis previously developed for handling Erie issues. 3 Miller presented a true conflict
since both the state and federal systems had policies behind
their rules which were applicable to the facts at hand. In the
true conflict situation, the federal interest would normally prevail because the supremacy clause44 tolerates no other result in
a situation involving a legitimate federal interest. In cases involving a legitimate state interest as well as a legitimate federal
interest, however, the Rules of Decision Act45 has a tempering
effect in allowing the federal courts to weigh the strength of the
federal interest against the strength of the state interest. Without the Rules of Decision Act, no such weighing would be possible.
The state interest in having the Wilder rule followed in
Miller was legitimate in some respects but appeared very minimal. The weakness of the state interest allowed the federal
interest in Miller to prevail. This is an entirely different situation from the one in Szantay,46 where no true conflict existed
due to the lack of a state interest other than forum non conven,2 The rationale of diversity jurisdiction is discussed in BATOR, MISHKIN,
& WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

SHAPIRO,

1051-53 (2d

ed. 1973).
,3 Leathers, supra note 2. This system of analysis is outlined briefly at the beginning of this article.
" U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
'3 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970).
" Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965).
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iens. Nevertheless, the result in the two cases was the7
same-federal law prevailed. Miller also differs from Woods

and Angel.5 In both of those cases the state policy was sufficiently strong and due to the tempering effect of the Rules of
Decision Act on the supremacy clause, managed to overcome
the legitimate federal interest in provision of a forum for claimants of diverse citizenship. This view of Woods is a change from
my previous position regarding Woods as a false conflict with
no legitimate federal interest. This change is necessitated by
the now apparent federal interest in providing a forum for litigants of diverse citizenship." Although the result in Miller can
be justified by interest analysis, the same can be said of all the
Erie cases discussed in my previous article."0 There is one important difference which sets Miller apart from the previous
cases. The methodology used in reaching a decision in Miller
was substantially interest analysis, and the use of the correct
technique is much more important than simply having reached
the correct result.
The Sixth Circuit's handling of the crucial issues in Miller
began with a recognition that the result in Erie did a good deal
more than simply put state decisional law on an equal footing
with state statutory law." Erie brought an entirely new outlook
to the relationship between state and federal law. The court
also recognized under a strict adherence to the outcomedetermination 2 test the facts in Miller were indistinguishable
from Woods and Angel and hence a result in favor of access
would have been incorrect. This may be too harsh a reading of
the outcome-determination aspects of Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York,53 since I believe it was the intent of that decision to set
up an interest analysis similar to that adopted by the Sixth
1 Woods v. Interstate

Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
' Leathers, supra note 2, at 805. It is unfortunate that I did not recognize the
federal interest at the time of writing the earlier article. Woods furnished one of the
few good examples of a true conflict with a legitimate federal interest being deferred
to a strong state interest under the mandate of the Rules of Decision Act.
0 Leathers, supra note 2.
"
12

Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 312 (6th Cir. 1974).
For the formulation of this test, see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99

(1945).
53326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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Circuit in Miller." It still seems to me that the difficulties with
Guaranty Trust come from incorrect interpretations of the decision rather than any fault inherent in the decision. In any
event, the Sixth Circuit noted that the strict outcomedetermination view of Guaranty Trust had been modified by
the United States Supreme Court in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electric Cooperative,Inc.55and Hanna v. Plumer.5 This modification allowed the court to take a slightly different look at the
Rules of Decision Act than would have been possible under a
5 7
strict view of outcome-determination.
The Byrd and Hanna cases led the Sixth Circuit to view
the Rules of Decision Act "as mandating strict adherence to
state law which had substantive content, but not requiring
mimickery [sic] of state procedural rules which had little substantive content and were designed primarily for purposes of
state judicial administration." 51 The key to fitting this conclusion into an interest analysis is the recognition, apparent in
Leathers, supra note 2, at 802.
356 U.S. 525 (1958).
380 U.S. 460 (1965). In both Byrd and Hanna, the Supreme Court explained
that there were considerations other than "outcome" involved in the decision of
whether or not to follow state practice.
"Outcome-determination" analysis was never intended to serve as a talisman. . . .Indeed, the message of York itself is that choices between state
and federal law are to be made not by application of any automatic "litmus
paper" criterion, but rather by reference to the policies underlying the Erie
rule.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-67 (1965) (citation omitted). In Byrd, the Court
conceded that jury determination rather than judge determination of an issue in the
case may well affect the "outcome", but stated that
. . .there are affirmative countervailing considerations at work here. The
federal system is an independent system for administering justice to litigants
who properly invoke its jurisdiction. An essential characteristic of that system is the manner in which, in civil common-law actions, it distributes trial
functions between judge and jury and, under the influence-if not the command-of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the decisions of disputed questions of fact to the jury. The policy of uniform enforcement of state-created
rights and obligations . . . cannot in every case exact compliance with a
state rule-not bound up with rights and obligations-which disrupts the
federal system of allocating functions between judge and jury.
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1958) (citations and
footnote omitted).
- 507 F.2d 308, 313.
59 Id.
"
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Miller, that there may be rules which have both substantive
and procedural dimensions. The labels, as used in Miller, are
not mutually exclusive but may overlap in some respects. In
cases of overlapping state policies which conflict with federal
policies (in terms of interest analysis, these would be true conflicts), the policies behind the rules must be weighed to determine if state interests prevail. The court in Miller weighed the
policy behind the Kentucky door-closing requirement of Wilder
and found it to be too weak to outweigh the federal interest in
providing a forum for a diversity action.59 Therefore, the federal
court could hear a case which the state courts would not have
heard. This careful analysis and evaluation of the policies in
light of each other is exactly the manner in which courts ought
to decide Erie problems. Any other approach is too simplistic
to solve the very difficult issues of federalism involved.

1Il.

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT GUIDELINES

In addition to developing an interest analysis for determination of Erie issues, the Sixth Circuit in Miller adopted some
general guidelines to balance the interests identified. Although
a pattern of case law might eventually emerge, permitting the
formulation of rules to displace ad hoc weighing of interests in
particular cases, Miller seems a very early case for such an
undertaking. The analysis at work there seems to be at too
early a stage for generalizations about its future implementation. In any case, the court seems to have done a commendable
job of formulating guidelines. Although caution should be exercised in the future when relying on guidelines developed at this
early point, the guidelines are certainly worthy of careful consideration.
The first guideline formulated by the Sixth Circuit was
that when "the state provision is the substantive right or obligation being asserted, the federal court must apply it.""0 In

terms of interest analysis, there would be no conflict because
there would be no legitimate federal interest present. The notion that federal law could be the source of substantive liability
11Id. at 318.
60Id. at 314 (emphasis added).
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was discarded with the Erie decision. Both Erie and Guaranty
Trust"' illustrate the situation envisioned by the court's first
guideline. It is workable as long as the determination of what
is a substantive right is made by an analysis of policies rather
than by the use of labels. Given the handling of the issues in
Miller, it is clear that the Sixth Circuit will require analysis
rather than labels for application of this guideline.
The second guideline of Miller required that when "the
state provision is a procedural rule which is intimately bound
up with the substantive right or obligation being asserted, the
federal court must apply it."6 In terms of a conflict analysis,
this situation would present a true conflict in which federal
interests are deferrable to strong state interests. Examples of
such cases include Woods and Klaxon. Again, this guideline
simply cannot function if it is applied blindly and without a
thorough analysis of underlying policies, for state substantive
and procedural interests often intertwine. Weighing is impossible without analysis, and analysis is what the Sixth Circuit
intends. Neither this guideline nor the first have any application to the facts in Miller and are at best dicta; they are, however, indicative of the approach favored by the Sixth Circuit,
and it would do the practitioner well to give them careful consideration.
The court's third guideline controlled the Miller case and
provides as follows:
If the state provision is a procedural rule which is not intimately bound up with the substantive right or obligation
being asserted, but its application might substantially
change the outcome of the litigation, the federal court should
determine whether state interests in favor of applying the
state rule outweigh countervailing federal considerations
against application of the rule. If the state interests predominate, the state rule should be adopted. 3
This guideline covers the case of the true conflict in which the
state interest is not strong enough to overcome the federal in",For a discussion of these cases as false conflicts, see Leathers, supra note 2.
12 507 F.2d 308, 314.
a Id.
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terest. It may also control the case of the false conflict in which
a legitimate state interest is lacking, as in Szantay. This third
formulation, like the first two, clearly calls for an analysis and
weighing of interests. Also of great importance is its indication
that a state interest may prevail over a countervailing federal
interest. The ability to weigh and defer the legitimate interests
of the forum can only -come, according to Currie, 4 from the
legislature. That authority in the federal system comes from
the Rules of Decision Act. In the situation envisioned by the
court's third guideline, then, as in the others, analysis of policies must replace the application of facile tests.
CONCLUSION

The decision in Miller represents a great step forward in
the solution of Erie issues. Although the case could have been
decided on a much easier basis, the Sixth Circuit chose the
difficult route of allowing a federal court to diverge from the
result that would have been reached in a state court. Its technique for reaching the correct result is commendable in that it
utilizes analysis in an area in which courts have traditionally
been content to dispense with any searching examination of the
problems at hand. The failure of the court to develop fully the
dichotomy between access and choice of law makes a portion
of Miller rather dangerous as precedent, but the discussion of
the issue in the opinion seems sufficient to overcome that drawback for readers alert to the distinction. The guidelines set up
for weighing competing interests are arguably premature, but
at the present time seem to fit well with prior case law. With a
correct result and a step forward in methodology, the Sixth
11The interest analysis advocated by the late Brainerd Currie is the foundation
for the interest analysis which I set up for choosing between competing state and
federal rules. It was his contention that in a true conflict a court of the forum could
not defer the forum interest to a competing interest, regardless of the relative strengths
of the two. Only the legislature would have the power to defer a forum interest. It seems
to me that the compulsion in favor of forum law operates in Erie cases by virtue of
the supremacy clause. Yet there are instances in which in federal interest has been
deferred (Woods and Angel). This must be due to the influence of some legislative
command. The only possible source of that command is the Rules of Decision Act in
some cases, and the Rules Enabling Act in others. The works of Currie are compiled
in B.

CURIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

(1963).
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Circuit has made a genuine contribution to the solution of Erie
issues. The issues have been difficult ones, but their resolution
will be less difficult and more sound if other courts follow the
approach outlined by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Miller v. Davis.

